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lN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
,J[l('JL\EL .\IOXTGO.\IERY,
,JJAH l E .\I OX'l1 GO.\rnRY,
Ll\"Jl,\ .\[OXTGO.\IERY,
''>- tliPir gu;mliall ad litcm
,\L\ HIE D~\ YIS, and
BEHX J('E ·wooD POD ROZA,
Plaintiffs and Respondeuts,

Case
Ko. 10278

-YR.-

PREFJ<JRRED RISK

~IUTUAL
L\'BrR~\:JCE CO~IP ANY,

a corpora ti on,

/Jef1'111la11t a111l Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
8'l'A TE.\IENT OF THE CASE
This case, as outli11cd in appellant's statement of
facts hPlo\Y, illvolves the question as to whether or not
<111 a utorno hil<' lia hility iHsnrer has been substantially
]'l'r'.irnlic<•<l in a Ia-wsuit by reason of the insured 's total
disa [l[J<'n nrnce to testify at trial on his own behalf when
hi, 10:-;1 imolly is the only eYiclence for the defense.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case here on appeal is thr result of a pn•i·irJu,
case in the same district wherein the plaintiffs in tliP
instant case obtained a judgment against the clriwr r,f
an automobile which at the time of the accidr>nt 11 w
insured by the appellant Thereafter the plaintiffs (nspondents) brought direct action on their jucl)..'1nc 11 1
against the insurer resulting in a jnclgme11t agairn;t th1
msurer (appellant),
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The relief sought by defendant (appellant) is rc·1·rr
sal of the lower court's judgment in farnr of plai11tif,,
(respondents) and an order di rccting a ju<l1-,'1Ile11t i11
favor of defendant (appellant) of no cause o fadion.

1

STATEMENT OF F..:\ CTS
The appellant, Preferred Risk ~f utnal 1nsuramc ,
Company, issued its automobile insnra1wr poli<'~- ( !•>:
hibit 17) to one Willard ·wood covering a J~l.J/ ileRoto.
On June 25, 1957, the vehicle was involved in an ae!'ident while being driven by 2\Ir, "\Vood 's son, Dnrrel
There was no other car involved and au action 11·ns
brought against the son, Darrel Wood, hy two of tl1e
three passengers, one Bernice \Vood and the heirs of :i
second passenger, one Lois Montgomery, wl10 <lir>d il'
a result of her injuries. The action was eomrnt•11rNl i11
the Second District Court for Davis Couutv, tlw reesidence of the defendant, and an Answer wns filed on
behalf of the defendant hy the attorneys for :ippl'llnnt
Shortly thereafter, appellant obtained :i sworn romt
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1q 1orter statement (Exhibit 13) from the defendant as
11 ~11ns1111(' from the remaining fourth passenger (Exhibit
11), 011e Law re11ee Merrick.

It is to he note<l here that

~fcrri('k \l'<ts nsleep at the time the aeeillent oecurred and

c1,11 irl e-iY<' 110 pc•rtinent facts of tl1e occurrences surroundill gtlil' a('cident itself (Exhibit 14, p. 1-!), (T. 40, L. 17).
Xutliiu;.; of significance occurred thereafter until
:\11r1•rnlier, l~l:J8, at which time the plaintiffs took the
,i,.p1Jsi1101t of the drfornla11t

(J<~xhibit

B).

Follo-wing

it,; t 1;11b1Tipt ion it was maile11 to the insured 1Yith in'trnctio11s to Jinn· the dl•fenc1ant real1, correct, sign, haYe
11otariz1·11, mll1 return to appellant's counsel within ten
1t<ib

(E\:l1il1it +).

The <lepositioH was not returned

:i11•l tli1 r1·<1ftl'r all !'fforts to locate him were to no an1il.
,\ll li•t\1·rs to tlil' 0111:-· addrc:-;ses of the c1efenda11t 1nrc

r1·lnr1:1•1l, marked "mon)d left
~'.

;, I. a11d 8).

f11rl.-:

\1 n1·

110

address" (Exhiliits 1.

Dnring- this period arn1 subsequent, ef-

rnn1k to locatl' the defornlant through his par-

1J1L;, 1111· i11snred 's <1ttorney, and tlte DaYis County Att11rnc·» ! Exl1ihits IT, Jlp. 2, 3; 12, p. 2: T. 16, L. 1; T. 63,

T..

~OJ nil to 110 an1i1.

His parents L1ic1 not know his

' l1Pr1•;1I1out s d urirn~ the period shortly after the accident
1.Tirnr, 19:J7) (T. 02, L. 1) until 1962 (the trial 1rns heard
11 11 :'\1'pl1·mher 12, 1961). The defendant's wife also

mon·d witltont a forwarding· address ('r. 36, L. 3}. Also

il11ri11g- t!tis p<'riod a \rnrnmt 1Yas issued for his arrest in
!l~ri~ ( 'ount~· :md he 1rns not located lJy the police until
l :ir;~ ('I'. 4-:J, L. 24).

After pretrial the trial 1rns set and heard on Sep-

1i·mlirr 12, 1961, resulting in a judgment against the de-
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fendant. Prior to commencement of the trial, appellauto
counsel made an outline of its position ( ExhilJit I''
which restated its position outlined at the pretrial IE:i'
hibit 11).
Thereafter the instant action was broug-ht agaii!'I
the insurer, appellant, the defense of which \ms liasc·rl (JJi
the non-cooperation clause of the polic)· whieh nwls"
follows (Exhibit 17):
CONDITION 18
"The insured shall eoopera te \\·ith the eompa111
and, upon the company's reqm•st, shall alt1·11tl
hearings and trials and shall mrnist ill rffr('li11~
settlements, securing and giving e\·i<lellce, ol1tai11ing the attem1ance of witllesses ancl in the (·011
duct of suits ... ''
Had the insured heen present for the trial m1rl a'·
suming he testified as he did ill his sworn stah•m(•nt ;wl
deposition, his evidence eonceruing tl1e <\('('idc•11t 1n1nl1l
have been as follow::-;:
a. Lois l\Iontgomery, one of the plaintiffs, !incl
been driving prior to the accidellt hut \ras ~can 1l
of driYing after dark and in m1kllo\rn coirntrr
(Exhibit 13, p. 20).
b. Lawrence l\Ierrick, the third 1rnsse11ger, li: 11 l
bad eyes (referring to his driving) ([~xhihit 11
p. 21(.
c. He was traveling within the sp(•<'d limit (Ex
hibit 1a, p. 22; Exl1iliit 1:1, p. 32).
cl. He believed the cause of the acciclent was n
blowout (Exhibit 13, p. 24).
e. 'rhere was no protest as to liis m;inm•r of rlriiing (Exhibit 13, p. 27).
4

f. J fl> was not under the influenee of intoxicating
liquor (Exhibit 13, p. :n).
ft i.-, thus apparent that his testimony would have

Leen c1iamdrieally opposed to that of the plaintiff's
C\

itlenre.

ARGU~rENT

POINT I
THF~ COUR'r ERRED IN F AILIING TO FIND
THAT THE INSURED FAILED TO COOPKHATJ;~
WITH THE DEFENDANT AND
'I'IL\T f-lUCII FAILURE WAS A SUBSTANTIAL PRE.J~DICE TO THE IKSURER.
Some eourts ha\·e taken the position that the mere
of an insurecl from the trial is in itself a material hrea<'li of the condition requiring the cooperation of
tlJC· insun•<l so that the insurer's burden of establishing
tli1· lirP;wh is satisfied by merely showing tlw fact of nonat!c11da11l'L' or rdusal to testify. 7 Am . .Jnr. 2d 517. Other
conrt.s i1wlm1ing our ow11 haYe held, howeYer, that failure
of the insun•d to attem1 the trial standing alone is insuffir·i('11t. lll Ol1erlia11sley Y. J'racelers l11s11rancc Compa11y,
,j c·tah 2<1 1.\ tlie eonrt held:
ah~(·uce

"'rJ10ugli a11 1111rrasoiiablc (emphasis added) failnn· by insured to attend the trial and testify when
l1P is a material wit11ess is a breaeh of cooperation dause in automohile liability policy where
failmc• to appear is excusable or justifiable and
Jllif 1c itl/() 11 t good reaso 11 (emphasis added), it does
not, in it:-;df, eonstitnte laek of cooperation withi ug 1'Ueh policy.''
5

Also,
'' E,-en if insured 's failure to attend trial were l'io.
lation of cooperation clause in automobilr• Jia_
hility policy, unless insurance company is , 11 J,.
stantially prejudiced hy such absence, it is uot a
ntlid defense against the injured third party."

It would thus appear, therefore, that if the

ill~Ul'1'ii

fails to attend the trial without a valid excuse, ju.stificution, or good reason, he has breached the eooprr;ili1'11
clause of the policy.

As i11clicate<l ahon, hcrn·en•r, for

a valid defense of uon-cooperation the failure to attf'llll
the trial must result in substantial prejudice to the
insurer.
Therefore, it seems the question to lH' cletermi1wil
on this appeal is whether or not the illsnrecl 's foilm1' 111
attend the trial, to sign and return deposition, or to arl
,-ise and make known his \\·hereabouts so that tliL· im111e1
could take his deposition for use at the trial resultrcl
a substantial prejudice to the insurer.
to be the case.

i11

This \rr heli''\I'

Aside from the fad that tl1P i11~urhl''

testimony as per his statement (Exhihit 1;>) nrnl rn1signecl copy of his deposition ( E:d1 i hit 1:-l) \\/Is ( nrnpletely incongruous with th0 testimmi:i· of th0 plaintit:
at the trial would clearl.v irnlirnt0 that 11is tc·>'!inw11y \111.,
exreme1;- ,-ital to his defense arnl more partieulnrl.r so

by reason of the fact that he \\·as thP !ml~- witJJess to the
accident that could refute tl1l' C'vicl011re of the plai11tiff,.
This we believe to lw far more importnnt in a ,~itunti 1111
such as this wherein it is a 011e-car aeci<le11t aml the illlly
persons with knowledge of what actnall)" oecurrecl '11 "
the occupants of the car. This i:-; also horne out liy tlie
6

trial judge in his Memorandum Decision (R. 26) wherein
t!JP Court stated (P. 3):
''If hclieYecl, (referring to the insured 's statement [Exhibit 15] and the unsigned copy of the
deposition [Exhibit 13]) it would be a complete
defrnse to the action.''

l'.11der this set of cirenmstances and more so in view
of the fact that the plaintiffs had to onrcome the provisio11s of our guest statute, it would seem readily apparent
that the illsured 's failure to appear at the trial is the epitome of 11011-eoopcration and created not only substantial
prejmlicP hut aetually total and absolute prejudice which
in 1w wa)' ecmld lie overcome by the insurer.
The Court also in its ~Iemorandum Decision observes
tliat th<:' insurer did not ask any questions at the time
plaintiffs took the deposition of the insured. We do not
fr.el tl1is to he either unusual or inconsistent with the
usual pradiec of defense attorneys. Certainly if the
insur<:'r's attorneys had had any inkling of the mrnYailahility of hiwing the insured present for trial his deposition would liavc been taken or would have thoroughly
1·niss-exami11cd all<l wai,·ed his signature at the time the
plailltiffs took insured 's deposition ( T. 15, L. 12).
We hclien the law of a great majority of jurisdctions iR generally stated in 139 A. L. R. 7~J3 as follows:
Conduct on the part of the assured which makes it
impos;;ible for the insurer to get in touch with
him in the face of an impending trial, although
<liligont search was made for him, justifies a conclusion that the assured has failed to meet the

condition of the policy rnquiring him to rooprr
ate with the insurer, so as to relieYe the immrcr of
liability thereunder, where th0 t0stimo11~· of th,,
insured was material. <'urraJ1 Y. C1n111el'fi111f ] 11 .
dcm11ity Co111pa11y (Hl-U) 127 Conn. G9:2, :211 .\.

2d 87.

Our position is borne out further in 60 A. L. H. :2d llil:
"(the court) stating that there' could hC' 110 doul1t
that the insured 's failure to coopNatP \ms both
prejudicial and injurious to the garnisl1P1· i11,m1·i,
where the insured, dri\·er of one of the antomn.
biles inYolwd in a collisioll in \Yhiel1 th1• pl<1i11tiffs were injured, dis a pp ea red from hl'r hom1· t11
avoid arrest and prosecution for unlawful arfoi.
ties not related to the accident, sr'YC'l'al 111011tl1.'
before the suits were initiated agaiJ1st hl'r l11·l11
that the trial court should han' dirrdPcl 11 nr
diet for the insurer as a math>r of la\\·. .\ltl1ou.d1
the court recognized the rule that thr insmn lwil
the hurde11 of proYing that tl1e l>rl'<teh of thr·
clause was such as to r0sult in suhstaHtial prcjn
dice and injury to its position, it statecl that .•;i1ch
prejudice was shown sillee thP iJ1surc1l 1rn~ i1nl
onl~· an essential witness at the trial, lmt tl1e uni;
witness for the defernw, arnl her :1i1l \ms 11\!crssary for the 11reparation an1l trial of tl111 ,nit'
against ]:er. Rejecfo1g tl1C' eonkntion that lwr alisence was not injurious hPr·aus0 i-;lll' !ind no nwil'·
rial evidence to offer a11d JIO Yalid 1lefr11~r· to th1·
charcre
of ne<r]i,,ence
tlie court said that ('\'('ll it
'
h
1':"'I
b
'
the insured's liahility \\·as elpar, tlil• i11,.;1m·1 wa'
prejw1iC'ed l>~· lier failurP to co11tl'st tl1P important issue of the amount of darnagei-; 1o lH' ;111nnled." Cameron v. Bcr,r;er, 7 A. 2d 2!l:1.
Also,
"Assured 's Yiolation of d~lllSl' in automobile· i11
clemnity policy hy failure to cooperate in defr1 10 ''

8

of action by injured party held valid defense in action h;· injured party against insurer after obtainiug ju<lgrne11t against assured where insurer was
prejudiced h;· assured 's violation of cooperation
dauRe." Jh!Ja11els v. Ocw:ral Insurance Compr111y of ~1merica, et al, 36 P. 2d 829.
Also (referring to assured 's failure to attend trial after
gi\·iug insurer report that he was free from blame):
"'\\' e are also of the opinion and we think most
of the authorities are agree(l that the provision
(eooperation) must he one reasonably necessary
for 1l1e protection of the insurance company, and
one· which can readily he complied with by the
assu1wl; and the violation of the condition by the
assnn'd cam10t he a valid defense against the injurerl party unless in the particular case it appvars that the insurance company was substantiall.\· prejudiced thereby. Here these elements
<ll'l' all present.
To require the cooperation of
the assured to the> extent of attendance at the trial,
wlil'll 11l' is a material and important witness, in a
perfodly rea:,;onahle condition. Failure to testi±\ may he as damaging as failure to give notice
of the accident of of the suit. There is, of course,
i10 obligation on his part to testify favorably to
thP l'ompany 's interests, but here this report of
the acci<k>nt irnlicatecl that a defense existed, and
it would normally be expected that his testimony
would hear this out. U11der these circumstances
the• <·ompm1y was clc>arl.\· prejudiced by his failure
to nppl•ar. ''II y11di11g \'. llo111c Accident l11surauce
Crn111;a1u1, 7 P. 2cl 999.
Also in,1p1ile111a11, Vol. 8, p.148:
'"l'he Yoluntary disappearance of the insured and
his eonsequent failure to atteml the trial, has been
liPJ<l to release the insurer of its obligation under
9

the policy." Hoff Y. St. Pa11l Mercury l11rlc11111ity
Company, 74 F. 2c1 689; Klei11sch 111it Y. Farmers
Mutual Hail Ins11ra11ce Associatio11, 101 F. 98i;
Associated Indem11it y Corporation '" Daris, 45 F.
Supp. J18; Hy11di11g \'. Tlome Ar·cidrnt Insura11ce
Company, 7 P. 2cl 999; Scli11eider v. A11foist M11 •
tual l11s11rance C'o111pa11y, :3-1-6 Ill. 137; H11tt '"
Tracelcrs I11s11ra11ce Cmnpa11y, 110 N ..J.L. 5i:
Mionis v. Merchants M11t11al Casualty Compa11y,
172 N.Y.S. 2d 727.

CONCLUSION
On the basis of the facts as reYealed hy the rrrord in
this matter and the law as discuss eel and presented herein, we do not feel that the finding of the trial court

('311

be reconciled either to the facts or the facts to the law.
The court's reasoning and findings to reach thP result
are as illogical as portions of its ~Iemornllllum DPrision
inferring that the insurer denloped the situation delilr
erately ·when the insurer had eYerything to gain and nothing to lose by haYing the insure<l present at tl1e trial to
testify.
Appellant here\\·ith respecti'nll:· requests the court to
reverse the judgment of this district conrt.
Respectfully snlJrnite<l,

KIPP AND ( 'I-IARLIRR
TEL

c H..\.ltLIEH

520 Bosto11 Building
Salt Lake City, Ftah

Attorneys for Defendant
and Appellant
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